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Competitive Balance in Major - League Baseball
Abstract
Major League Baseball is in trouble. The recent players' strike is just one in a series of player/owner
problems that have beset this sport over the past century. Since the U.S. Supreme Court granted baseball
owners exemption from the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts in 1922, a constant and ongoing battle
has been waged between owners and players on what is best for the competitive balance of the game, for
the financial stability of the clubs, and for the welfare of the players.
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The problem centers around the structure of
the labor market, which has ranged from the
noncompetitive reserve system to the present
day, highly competitive free agency system.
According to the owners, with a growing crisis
stemming from the unequal distribution of
revenues among the clubs, the competitiveness
of the labor market has a profound effect on
the ability ofteams to field a competitive team
and stay financially stable.
Despite numerous challenges to the
Supreme Court's landmark decision, the Court
consistently held that baseball was exempted
under current antitrust law.
Many of the
practices that baseball ownership engaged in,
although challenged in the courts, 'had
continued for years with little or no threat of
reform. Two notable cases were Toolson v.
The New York Yankees in 1953 and Flood v.
Kuhn in 1972, in which the Court not only
upheld the exemption, but also stated that the
immunity would exist until ~ act of Congress
removed or modified it (Markham and Teplitz
1981,.. p.8). In 1977, the House Select
Committee on Professional Sports issued a
report that addressed this antitrust issue, but
no legislation was initiated. To this day, no
bill has made it out of both houses of
Congress.
One issue ofthe exemption that has drawn
a great deal of attention over the years has
been the reserve clause. In essence, this clause
allowed owners to re-sign their players at
whatever price they felt was appropriate,
without fear of losing that player to a higher
bid from another team. The only way a player
could leave the club that originally signed him
was either to be released or to be traded.
There was no such thing as a free agent. The
reasoning behind this clause was one of
supposedly benevolent purposes. Owners
were determined to protect the competitive
balance in the game of baseball, and they felt
that a purely competitive system in the labor
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C·OMPETITIVE
BALANCE
IN
MAJOR -LEAGUE
BASEBALL
by Matthew T. Jontry

"When the Supreme Court says baseball
un't run like a business, everyonejumps up
and down with joy. When I say the same
thing, people throw pointy objects at me. "
-The late Bill Veeck, former
owner ofthe Indians and White
_ Sox

I. INTRODUCTION AND mSTORY
Major League Baseball is in trouble. The
recent players' strike is just one in a series of
player/owner problems that have beset this
sport over the past century. Since the U.S.
Supreme Court granted baseball owners
exemption from the Sherman and Clayton
Antitrust Acts in 1922, a constant and on
going battle has been waged between owners
and players on what is best for the competitive
balance of the game, for the financial stability
ofthe clubs, and for the welfare of the players.
9

market (the players) would tip' the balance in
favor of the more profitable clubs. Many of
the labor disputes between the owners and
players have resulted from this issue.

A const~t and on-going
battle has been waged
between owners and players
on what is best for the game,
for the financial stability .of
the clubs, and for the welfare
of the players.

A. SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGES TO
THE RESERVE CLAUSE

The first dent in the- owners' armor came
in late December, 1975, when the old reserve
clause was finally eliminated. However,
owners still had the option of renewing a
contract for one additional year after the
original contract had expired. Still, research
shows that compensation rose as did the
number of multi-year contracts after the 1975
decision (Hill and Spellman 1983, p.2).
Another setback (from the owners' viewpoint)
came with the new Major League Agreement
signed in 1985.
Faced with declining
revenues and no strike insurance, the owners
agreed to shorten the service requirement for
free agency and salary arbitration eligibility.
However, the owners were not to be undone
and were detennined to stop the escalatin~
salaries that unrestricted free agency would
bring. A basic, unspoken agreement was
reached among the owners not to bid on any
free agents. It is interesting to note that 62
players filed for free agency at the end of the
1985 season, and not one ofthem received an
offer from any team other than the one they
had played for during the 1985 season ( Quirk
and Fort 1992, p. 197). All 26 owners must
have been experiencing financial difficulties or
have been extremely content with how their
teams had performed that season.
What ensued were three separate collusion
grievances filed by the Player's Union, and all
were found in their favor. Thus, the owners
were facing an explosion of player salaries.
One ofthe owners' oldest arguments for
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preserving the reserve clause was to maintain
a co~petitive balance among teams and to
allow the smaller market teams to compete
with the big market teams by retaining their 
star players with smaller salaries or selling
them for a considerable profit. The big
market/small market argument is rooted in the
reality that there are large differentials in terms
of the revenue that each team generates.
Whether it is due to population, fan support,
or tradition has yet to be determined. In
addition, whether the revenue differentials had
anything to do with fielding a competitive
team before free agency emerged is debatable.
Research has shown that competitive balance
actually increased after the emergence offree
agency in 1976 (Zimbalist 1992, p.95). The
~ was ~ all owners were enjoying yearly
Increases In fan attendance, lucrative revenue
shares from the league's national television
contract (CBS bought the network broadcast
rights in 1988 for four years at the bargain
basement price of $1 billion), and a steady
. stream of revenue from licensing.
B.

THE PRESENT SITUAnON

Presently, the state ofprofessional baseball
does not look as healthy. Due to the hired
gun mentality ofthe players and the scrambling
10

of owners to sign players with fan-drawing
power, salaries have risen from a league
average of $400,000 in 1989 to the present
average of $1.2 million per player in 1994.
Although these figures are not inflation
adjusted, it is still a 300% increase over a five
year period. The percentage oftotal revenue
that owners spend on players' salaries has
risen from 41% to 58%· over the same five
year span ( The Economist, 13 Aug. 1994,
59). Coupled with these increases is the
diminishment of national television revenues.
These revenues are split equally among the
teams, and after CBS lost" an estimated $500
million on its four-year deal that expired in
1993, the networks weren't exactly lined up at
the door to bid for the rights, and advertisers
were not as anxious to pay top dollar for
airtime during ball games. Hence, all the
teams will realize a noticeable drop in
revenues. This has a dramatic impact on the
competitive balance, because the shared
reveJ)~e ofa lucrative contract tended to assist
the small market teams in becoming more
competitive financially. Not only did it
provide extra revenue for all teams, but it
increased the exposure of the small market
teams, enabling them to widen their markets
and increase their fan appeal. Without the
large national television contract, the small
markets lose a vital resource in remaining
competitive. The teams who will be able to
bid on and sign the free agents and still remain
financially afloat are the ones in big media
markets with lucrative local cable TV
contracts.
This phenomenon is given no
better illustration than when one compares the
local media revenues of the most valuable
franchise in the league, the New York Yankees
(est. value: 5225 million), and one ofthe least
valued franchises, the Seattle Mariners (est.
value: 571 million). The Yankees annually
receive about $50 million in local media
revenues, while the Mariners' take is about $5

million (Zimbalist 1992, p. 49). Yet both
teams must compete in the same market of
free agency. It seems like a difficult situation
for clubs like the Mariners to field a
competitive team. The distribution of total
revenues has been made more unequal by the
large differences in local media revenues.
The purpose of this study is to reach a
reasonable conclusion as to whether these
factors (such as the revenue differences
between big and small market clubs) have any
bearing on the competitive balance of the
league in terms of win-loss records. If a
competitive imbalance is found, then it is
useful to find the causes of this imbalance,
possibly a comparative advantage for the big
market teams in financing payrolls. Finally, we 
must test whether this comparative advantage,
if present, translates into more success (more
wins) for the big market teams, on average, as
compared to the average success of the small
market teams.

n.

LITERATURE REVIEW

On the surface, the mere structure of
Major League Baseball seems to lend itselfto
general cartel theory. There are a limited
nurrlber of firms. There is restricted entry,
along with a division of territorial markets to
which each club has "franchise" rights. In
addition, the output (in this case, the number
ofgames played) is limited to 162 per club per
year. Yet, there is no price fixing agreement
among the clubs for the final product, the
game, nor is there currently a limit on the price
of the primary factor of production, the
players. This has led a few economists to
believe that the seemingly collusive behavior
that professional clubs and their owners
engage in has a different motivation than
extracting monopoly profits. Markham and
Teplitz (1981, p.19) offered an explanation for
this behavior. In a highly comprehensive study
11

done in anticipation of then forthcoming
Congressional hearings, Markham and Teplitz
pointed to the peculiarities of professional
sports leagues in general and the baseball
industry itself as essential factors for collusive '
and cooperative behavior. The first was the
trade-off between competitive balance and
individual club·incentive. The success of the
league (its ability to draw fans to the game or
entice them to view it on television) depends
on the competitiveness of the event. The
public is more likely to attend a game that is
evenly matched and that will provide an
outcome that is unknown because it heightens
their interest. On the other hand, there must
be an incentive for the team to play well and
exert a suitable effort to win games. To
achieve the former condition, leagues have
rules such as the reverse-order draft, where the
least talented teams (according to winning
percentage) in one year have the first
opportunity to sign the best new players for
the next season. The reserve clause, which
allows teams to retain their own players
without fear of losing them to a club offering
more money, also seeks to maintain
competitive balance. Activities such as these
seek to equalize clubs over time, and add

garity on a learly basis.

As George Steinbrenner put
it, "It (how much to pay a
player) depends on how
many fannies he puts in the
seats," known more formerly
as marginal revenue product.
These measures seem to work, despite
the relaxation of the reserve system's claim to
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players over the past eighteen years due to the
advent offree agency. Zimbalist (1992, p:95)
points to the fact that over the time period of
1975-1990, only three of the 26 teams failed
to win their division at least once, that si~een
different teams won the pennant in their
respective league, and twelve different teams
won the World Series. He also states that
attendance has increased from a total of29.8
million (1.24 million/club) in 1975 to 56.9
million (2.19 million/club) in 1991. Ther~
seems to be some correlation between the
balance of competition and the demand for
baseball as an avenue of entertainment.
The incentive for victory is more difficult
to quantify. Markham and Teplitz offered the
explanation that the owners, players, and the
community gain personal satisfaction and
utility from winning, not necessarily financial
gain. However, the winners ofDivisional and
League Championships, as well as the World
Series, receive a share of the revenue
generated from those contests. The club
receives a share, as do the individual players.
In any case, there is an incentive to win ball
games and to remain competitive as a club, but
the long run vitality of the league as an entity
also depends a great deal on a competitive
balance.
Not all theoretical analysis of Major
League Baseball and professional sports in
general are in their favor, however. Demmart
(1973, p. 140) concluded that the long run
success ofa tearn and its profitability depended
on the strength of its market. He further
believed that there would be a tendency for
clubs located in strong markets (like New
York and Los Angeles) to be both
economically and sportingly superior to teams
located in smaller markets (such as Pittsburgh
and San Diego). He felt that the reserve
clause was ineffective in eliminating long run
inequality within the league, and that its only

useful purpose was as a rent transfer
mechanism from players to owners, assuring
the economic viability of the league at the
expense of player salaries. Demmart makes
some other strong points, but his data and
discussion are somewhat dated and irrelevant,
since free agency was granted two years after
his analysis was published. The fact ~hat parity
exists after the advent of free agency in 1975
and after further relaxation of free agency
restrictions in 1985 is undisputed when one
compares it to the reserve clause era of 1922
1975. The level of competitiveness has
increased.
However, with the growing
revenues of local cable contracts for the big
market teams and a decline in revenues from
the shares from the national broadcast
contract, there is a possibility that the ability of
small market teams to bid competitively for
quality free agents (therefore making their
teams more competitive) will be weakened.
The effect of television revenues was
something that neither Markham and Teplitz
nor Demmart took into account in their
analyses. They also did not foresee the
explosion ofplayers' salaries that management
experiences today.

m.

revenue. The MRP is the most the team will
pay because paying more would reduce team
profits, while paying less would increase team
profits. The MRP is the maximum any player
can expect to earn from the club. The
minimum that he can expect to earn is called
the reservation wage. This is what a player
could expect to earn for his next .best
employment opportunity, or the -..league
minimum, whichever is higher. The MRP and
the reservation wage represent the upper and
lower bound, respectively, of what a player
can expect to earn. Just how far apart these
two extremes are depends on the degre"e of
negotiation freedom between owners and
players and the relative bargaining power of
the two parties. The -more freedom for - .
negotiation (under a free agency system, for
example), the closer the MRP and reservation
wage will be to one another.
How does this theory apply to the
negotiation process? Under unrestricted free
agency, the bargaining will take place on its
highest possible leve~ with owners and players
free to negotiate with whomever they choose.
Each player will end up signing with the team
to which he is most valuable (where he. has the
highest MRP). His salary will lie between this
MRP and the player's MRP for the team to
which he is the second-most valuable (his
second highest MRP). The reasoning behind
this is that the team to which the player-is most
valuable can outbid any other team for the
player's services, and still increase profits by
hiring him. But the team must still offer him at
least the MRP of the team to which he is the
second-most valuable. This outcome can be
summed up by the following relationship:
MRP2 ~ SALARYJ: ~ MRP.
where MRP. is the highest MRP that a player
has for anyone team, SALARYE is the salary
he can expect to be paid, and MRP2 is the
second-highest MRP that a player has for any
one team.

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

Much of my theoretical discussion will be
based upon the work of James Quirk and
Rodney Fort (1992), who used the standard
applications of supply and demand law to the
market for labor services in Major League
Baseball. From the viewpoint of anyone club,
the most this club will offer a player for his
services is the amount that this player will add
to team revenues. As George Steinbrenner put
it, ''It (how much to pay a player) depends on
how many fannies he puts in the seats." This
is more commonly known as the player's
marginal revenue product, or MRP. It is a
product ofmarginal productivity and marginal
13

In an ideal situation, this process would
equalize the teams' competitiveness.
Assuming that each team could only attract so
many fans per year (a sellout at each game),
there would be limits as to how much a team
could spend on payroll per year since revenues
would be limited by attendance (if one assumes
stadium capacities of roughly equal size).
There will be variability in ticket prices due to
clubs facing shifting demand curves in their
markets, but these will even out due to the
cyclical nature of performance, which is
affected by player depreciation, injuries, and

they are being paid), a team has benefited its
own cause by depriving the other teams of
those players' services. Put simply, a club can
help its chances of winning, and, as a result, its
chances of increasing demand for its product,
by fielding the better team, man-for-man,
position-by-position.
Also, this practice may have the potential
to realize future profits for the team in seasons
to come. The future value of assembling an
outstanding team now, regardless of current
MRP's, may be the determining factor that
causes owners to spend excess money on free
agents.
Finally, there is the explanation that some
owners aren't worried about MRP's or the
bottom line. According to Zimbalist (1992, p..._.
94), a "true sportsman" lies in the hearts of
some owners, driving them to field a
competitive team, no matter what the cost.
This argument is supported by the fact that
many owners have other business interests,
some much larger than their respective
baseball franchise ownership. The loss of a
few million dollars on the franchise's balance
sheet might be more easily accepted if those
other interests are profitable and the owner has
the prestige and satisfaction of wimiing the
Division, the Pennant, or the World Series.

~lainluck.

According to Zimbalist, a
"true sportsman" lies in the
hearts of some owners,
driving them to field a
competitive team, no matter
what the cost.
However, we do not live in an ideal world,
and the fact of the matter remains that there
are owners who will pay more than a player's
MRP. Why would an·owner do this? The
most obvious reason may be that an owner has
misjudged a player's worth. The player was
not worth the money paid to him. An
extension of this explanation could be that the
owner was accurate in his assessment of the
player's ability, but other variables (the change
of venue, competitive pressure, injury, or
complacency as a result of a lucrative, long
term contract) may have a depreciating effect
on his value to the team.
Another e~planation stems from the fact
that by buying the most talented players (even
though their MRP's are lower than the salaries
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IV. HYPOTHESES
Due to the rising salary levels of today's
players, it is only a matter of time before some
teams will be forced to dump high-priced
talent and settle for fielding a less competitive
team just to stay afloat financially. I attribute
this problem to the big media market/small
media market phenomenon in professional
baseball. As was pointed out earlier, big
market teams have a comparative advantage
due to local cable revenues. Teams like the
New York Yankees and the Chicago Cubs
14

agency in 1985.
This infonnation was
either play in large geographic markets or are
provided by the World Almanac Series.
covered by a national cable station like WGN
Average total 'revenue for each particular
, and these resources give them a tremendous
team over the time period of 1987-1991 is the
advantage over smaller market teams in
dependent variable (AVGTOT) in the proxy
bidding for top free agents every year. The •
regression. Average total revenue is closely
added revenues from these cable contracts and
related to the ability of teams to finance their
big market operations give them a cushion that
player payrolls from year to year. The first
allows their demand for top players to be
independent variable is average media
greater, pennitting them to obtain more ofthe
revenues (AVGMED) of that same period.
top players by being able to meet their salary
Media revenues are relevant to the
demands. They will trade a portion of their
hypothesized revenue differential of large
huge profits for victories that could possibly
market and small market teams. The second
generate even larger profits the following
independent variable is average stadium
season. Thus, smaIl market teams will find the
competitive balance tipping against them.
capacity utilization (AVGCAP), which is
I have formed three hypotheses. First, I
derived by taking the average annual total
test the hypothesis that since 19.B-6 (when free
_ attendance of a particular team and dividing
agency rules became dramatically unrestricted)
that value by a product of stadium capacity
there has been no improvement in the
and number of home games per season. This
competitive imbalance ofprofessional baseball.
will give a ratio of actual fan patronage to
Second, I test the hypothesis that big market
maximum fan patronage, or, as we know it,
teams, because of their comparative
stadium capacity utilization. This will give us
advantage, have a higher average payroll over
an idea of how strong fan support is within a
the same period. Finally, I will test the
market and how it might affect average total
hypothesis that the big market teams have been
revenue.
on the winning end of the competitive
The final independent variable used is a
imbalance due to their comparative advantage
performance variable (AVGDIV). The actual
in revenue.
success a team has had in recent years in
winning divisional championships should have
V. PROXY DERIVAnON
an effect on the amount oftotal revenue it can
generate through fan support.
The
The method I used to derive a proxy
relationship between the dependent variable of
defining big market teams and small market
average annual total revenue and the
teams was an OLS regression oftotal revenue
respective independent variables is described
generation. Utilizing media revenue data,
by the linear equation:
stadium capacity utilization data, and a
AVGTOT = B 1 + BJ(AVGMED)
performance variable as independent variables,
+BJ(AVGCAP) +B4(AVGDIVj
I derived an equation for total 'revenue
where B. is the coefficient of the respective
generation. The media revenue and stadium
independent variable. The signs for each
cap~city data were found in Quirk and Fort's
independent variable were expected to be
Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional Team
positive, and all displayed a positive nature in
Sports.
The performance variable is the
the regression. The t-statistics for AVGMED,
number ofdivisional championships each team
AVGCAP, and AVGDIV were 9.9276,
has won since the advent of unrestricted free
15

6.1045, and 1.8141, respectively. Thus, all
independent variables where found to be
significant to the 10% level, and the variables
A VGMED and A VGCAP were significant to •
a 1% level. Further proof of the adequacy fit
of this model is evident in the adjusted R2 of
the equation, which is .8916.
In order to designate a market size for
each respective ball club, I compared the
actual average total revenue that each team
had generated over the specified time period to
the estimated average total revenue over the
same period. The estimated average total
revenue for each team was calculated by
reinserting the media, capacity, and
perfonnance data into the regression equation
that was derived from these three variables.
That is, I tested the regression equation to see
how well it described the actual revenue data.
My results were fairly accurate. Although the
actual order ofteams and their revenue values
were not identical to the regression equation's
order and estimated revenue values, both
populations showed the same 13 teams in the
top 50% (big market designation) in tenns of
-average total revenue and the same 13 teams
in the lower 50% (small market designation).
Thus, a reasonable proxy can be derived. For
the pwposes ofmy hypotheses, the division of
big market and small market teams is defined
by the actual average total revenue. The top
13 teams in terms of actual average total
revenue are designated big market te~s, and
the bottom 13 teams are designated small
market teams. The breakdown of teams and
their respective average total revenues are
shown in Table 1 (see next page).
VI. RESEARCH DESIGN

To test my hypotheses, I will be using
descriptive statistics and several graphs. My
analysis uses salary data, in 1991 dollars, from
The Park Place Economist v.3
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the period 1986-1991 as reported in Quirk and
Forts' Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional
Team Sports. The salary data for the years
1992 and 1993 were obtained from the
Chicago Sun-Times and the Chicago Tribune,
respectively. I adjusted the 1992 and 1993
salary data for inflation, using 1991 as the base
year. My analysis also uses final records~f all
teams from 1986-1993 as reported in various
editions of the Information Please Almanac
Series. Inflation rates for 1992 and 1993 were·
also located in this source.
VII. RESULTS
A. FIRST HYPOTHESIS

My first hypothesis was a test of the
competitive balance ofMajor League Baseball.
More specifically, I attempted to show that a
competitive imbalance was still present, even
after the relaxation of free agency rules in
1985. The results from testing my first
hypothesis show a competitive imbalance-in
professional baseball when one analyzes the
frequency distribution of WIL percentages
over the period of 1986-1993. To measure
competitive balance, I have used a two
pronged approach. The first was an analysis
of the standard deviation ofWIL percentages
for all teams. Using the Noll-Scully approach'
(Quirk and Fort 1992), one can evaluate the
degree ofcompetitive balance in the league by
comparing the actual values of standard 
deviation for WIL percentage over a period to
the idealized value of standard deviation,
which is the standard deviation of WIL
percentages for a league in which every team
is of equal playing strength. In this idealized
league, the chance ofwinning a game for every
team is one-half in every game. Using the
formula for standard deviation, the idealized
value for a league with teams of equal playing
strength is shown by the expression (.5)/N 1f2 .

Table 1:

AVERAGE TOTAL REVENUE (1987-1991)
BIG MARKET
VALUE($M)
94
86.1
83.1
75
71.65
63.5
61.4
57.45
57.4
55.9
55.05
53.3
52.3

TEAM
N.Y. YANKEES
N.Y. METS
TORONTO
BOSTON
L.A. DODGERS
CHICAGO WHITE SOX

OAKLAND
ST. LOUIS
CHICAGO CUBS
TEXAS
PHILADELPHIA
KANSAS CITY
BALTIMORE

SMALL MARKET
VALUE($M)
SI.35
49.45
48.85
47.8
44.8
43.45
43
41.35
39.35
38.6
38.4
37.85
37.4

TEAM
CALIFORNIA
S.F. GIANTS
CINCINNATI
SAN DIEGO
DETROIT
PITTSBURGH
HOUSTON
MINNESOTA
SEATTLE
MILWAUKEE

CLEVELAND
ATLANTA
MONTREAL
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(1986-1993). I point to the comparison ofthe
.065 SD of the 1980-1990 period with my
calculated .06334 for the 1986-1993 period.
It is important to notice that we overlap some
years and that may affect the results.
However, there is support for my first
hypothesis that there has been no dramatic
improvement in the competitive balance of
Major League Baseball since the advent of
unrestricted free agency in 1985.

where N is the number of games a team plays
in a season. For a typical 162-game season,
the ideal standard deviation will be
(.5)/(162)lfl. This value becomes .03928, the
standard deviation of WIL percentage for a
perfectly competitive league. Measuring the
average standard deviation for our eight year
period, the value comes to .06334. A Chi
Square test showed this to be a significant
difference. A comparison of the observed
standard deviations of WfL percentage with
Noll and Scully's ideal standard deviation is
shown in Table 2 (see next page). The Chi
Square test ofthe significance ofthe difference
between these two standard deviations is
shown in Table 3. Hence, Major League
Baseball has a significant competitive balance
problem when one compares the actual
standard deviation to the ideal standard
deviation. These results are shown in Figure
1. The idealized league would form a normal
distribution (bell-shaped curve) around the
hea~. solid line at the .500 WIL mark, with
rougwy two-thirds of the WIL percentages
coming within +/- 1 SD (the dashed lines).
The increments on the x-axis each equal 1
standard deviation. Visually, one can see the
excess tail frequencies accounting for more
than five percent ofthe WfL percentages.
My . main contention was that the
competitive imbalance had not improved since
unrestricted free agency came in 1985. Due to
insufficient data, I was not able to estimate the
average standard deviation for the ten years
(1976-1985) prior to my sample and compare
the, two. However, Quirk and Fort did
calculate the standard deviation for the periods
of 1970-1979 and 1980-1990, and those
values were .076 and .065, respectively. This
shows a significant increase in the competitive
balance during the transition years (1976-85),
but it also shows no dramatic improvement
through the unrestricted free agency era

The Park Place Economist v.3

B. THE SECOND HYPOTHESIS

My second hypothesis was that big market
teams, because of their larger revenues, have
comparative advantage in bidding for free
agents. As a result, the average annual payroll
for players' salaries should be higher for the
big market teams. Using average annual salary
data for each team from the period 1986-1991,
I assumed a 25-man roster and found the total
payroll for each team for each year in the
period. While the salary data for 1986-1991
were in 1991 dollars, the salary data for 1992
and 1993 were nominal; therefore, I adjusted .
these data for inflation, using 1991 as the base
year. I then separated the big market teams
from the small markets teams and found the
average total payroll for each group for each
year in the period. The results are shown in
the graph in Figure 2. The big market teams'
average total payroll was greater than the
small market average total payroll in each year.
One interesting thing to note about the graph
is the tremendous increase in average payroll
for both groups after the 1990 season. This
may suggest a·new, higher range of salaries
which may give the big market teams more of
an advantage in the next few years. It is also
interesting to note the plateau that exists in
average payroll for both groups (especially for
the big market teams) for the years 1986-1990.
This may be explained by the collusive
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Table 2:

COMPARISON OF ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF WIL PCT. WITH IDEAL NOLL
SCULLY DISTRIBUTION: 1986-1993

STANDARD
DEVIATION

·ACTUAL
ACTUAL
'IDEALN-S
CUMULATIVE
CUMULATIVE
FJiliQUENCY
DISTRIBUTIoN DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION

+/- 1

44.23%

44.23%

66.7%

+/- 2

35.09%

79.32%

95.0%

+/- 3

14.90%

94.22%

99.9%

~.,

Table 3:

cm-SQUARE TEST OF ACTUAL AVERAGE STANDARD DEVIATION VS. IDEAL 
STANDARD DEVIATION: 1986-1993
Ho

:

H.:

SDactuai = .03928 (SD...)
SDactual > .03928 (SD-..)

Reject H o if X2 > 240.20 (5% significance level)

538.25 > 240.20
Therefore, reject H o•
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Figure 1:

FIGURE 1
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Figure 2:
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agreements the owners had made not to bid on
free agents during that period. I believe there
was an attempt to keep players' salaries from
escalating.
I also tested the average salary differential •
for significance using a Z-test, which evaluates
the significance of a difference between the
means of two populations. In this case, the
two populations were the big market teams
and the small market teams. The means were
the average payrolls for each population.
These results are shown in Table 4 (see next
page). Four of the eight years showed a
significant difference between the average
payroll of the big market teams and the
average payroll of the small market teams.
Although the big market advantage was not
significant in all years of the study, there are
some trends could prove to validate the second
hypothesis more conclusively in the future.
The last three years showed a dramatic
increase in average payroll for both groups,
and the fact that the last two years show not
only significant differences but increasingly
significant differences may predict a larger
gulf in the future between the big market
payrolls and the small market payrolls.

c.

THE THIRD HYPOTHESIS

Now that it has been established that there
is a competitive imbalance. in the league and
that the big market teams are using their
comparative advantage to pay higher salaries,
there is a need to find some correlation
between the two. In other words, is the
comparative advantage of big market teams
translating into more average wins for them
than for the small market teams? This test is
easy to show, as it only requires comparing the
average wins per year for each group. I
summed the wins of all teams in each group
for each year and divided by 13, the number of
The Park Place Economist v.3

teams in the group. This gave me the average
wins in a given ye~ for big market teams and
the average wins in a given year for small
market teams.
A graphic, year-by-year
comparison is shown in Figure 3. Once again,
I tested the yearly difference of the averages
for significance using a Z-test. The actual data
and Z-test values are shown in Table 5. In
every year but one (1992), the average wills of
the big market teams were greater than the
average wins of the small market teams..
However, the results do not show a significant
difference in any year of our study. The
closeness ofthe average wins between the two
groups in the first three years may be
attributed to a lag that may occur in signing
free agents and assembling a competitive team.
Also, the collusion among the owners may
have had some effect on the relatively small
differential between groups for the years 1986
1989. The big market teams were not using
there comparative advantage to its fullest
extent. Ifwe recall the payroll plateau for the
same period, there is substantial eviden"ce for
this conclusion. Also the huge difference in
the final year (1993) suggests that the
comparative advantage is finally paying off It
will be interesting to see the difference
between the two groups over the next few
years. In conclusion, the evidence does not
show conclusive support for my third
hypothesis. However, the final year of both
the salary data and the average wins data show
that small market teams may ,not be as
competitive as the large market teams in the
future.
VIll. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDAnONS

The results of my tests seem to support
two of my hypotheses very well. In terms of
significance, my third hypothesis did not
respond very well to testing, but the trends did
22

Table 4:

AVERAGE ANNUAL SALARy DIFFERENTIALS: 1986-1993
(1991 DOLLARS)

YEAR
1986
1987*
1988*
1989
1990
1991
1992*
1993*

BIG MARKET SMALL MARKET
512,915,385
511,967,308
513,528,846
511,001,923
513,926,923
511,244,231
514,571,154
512,396,154
515,271,154
514,794,231
524,057,692
521,092,308
532,817,736
525,735,440
533,562,300
526,442,000

Z-TEST
0.7127
2.2774
2.1297
1.5165
0.3823
1.3335
2.4015
2.9573

(* = significant to .05 level)

Table 5:

AVERAGE ANNUAL WINS DIFFERENTIAL: 1986-1993

YEAR
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

BIG MARKET
82.38
81.69
81.23
83.54
82.54
82.69
79.31
83.69

SMALL MARKET
79.31
80.23
80.15
78.23
79.38
79.31
82.69
80.69

(*= significant to .05 level)

23

Z-TEST
0.7884
0.3871
0.2330
1.4351
0.9185
0.3302
0.8738
0.6681

Figure 3:

FIGURE 3
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raise some questions and legitimate concerns
about what the future will hold for the small
market teams.
One of the main , if not the main, issues if
the recent labor dispute between baseball's •
management and its players has been the
revenue gap between the big and small market
teams. There have been a number .proposals
brought to the negotiating table in an effort
either to close this gap or to limit the annual
payrolls ofeach team to a predetermined level.
These measures are more commonly known as
revenue-sharing and salary-capping. These
two measures are primarily used hand-in-hand
by other professional sports, such as the
National Basketball Association.
Under a revenue-sharinglsalary-cap plan,
allleague revenues, or certain percentages of
league revenues (local media revenues, for
example), are pooled and divided equally
among the teams. Obviously, this is an
attempt to equalize the financing power of all
teams for player payrolls and basic club
operations by providing them with
comparable, if not identical, revenues. A
certain percentage of these revenues are
guaranteed to the players, thus creating the
cap: each team has equal revenues, and an
exact percentage ofthese revenues can be used
for players' salaries. It is important to note the
term can be used in the previous statement.
Teams are not obligated to spend the
maximum amount ofthe salary cap. However,
just as there is a cap, there is a floor. Teams
are forced (by the players' union, no doubt) to
spend at least a minimal amount on players'
salaries. Assuming all teams have equally
competent general managers and scouts, talent
would be distributed relatively equally among
the teams by virtue of the salary cap and
revenue-sharing. In tum, the competitive
balance should improve due to this
redistribution of revenue and talent, ceteris
paribus.
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Despite the logical reasoning behind this
plan, it would be very difficult to predict its
effect. All things are not held equal; injuries 
occur, poor scouting and drafting are present,
and' pure luck is a large part of the game.
However, we can see the effects a revenue
sharing! salary-cap plan would have on total
revenue distribution. Using the same variables
utilized in deriving a big market/small market
proxy, I was able to more equally distribute
total revenue among the clubs when average.
total media revenues were split equally among
the clubs and entered back into a linear
regression with the stadium capacity and
performance variables.
Although not
conclusive, some support was given to the
revenue-sharinglsalary-cap plan.
Under the original league policy where
teams keep all their own local media revenues
and share national media revenues, the range
of average annual total revenues was $56.6
million (a maximum of $94 million and a
minimum of $37.4 million). The standard
deviation was approximately $15.42 million.
By comparison, according to the revenue
sharing regression, sharing media revenues
would reduce the range to $40 million and the
standard deviation to only $11 million. Both
of these figures are improvements in terms of
making average annual total revenue "more"
equal.
There are some problems with the
revenue-sharinglsalary-cap plan, however.
First of all, trying to limit players' salaries is .
always difficult to do. From a self-interest
perspective, players are reluctant to do
anything that would decrease their incomes, or
more appropriately, their future incomes.
Second, just as it is difficult to police cartel
output and price restrictions, it is also difficult
to police big market teams whose marginal
cost, under a salary cap plan, could quite
possibly be below their marginal revenue. In
other words, by the sheer size of their market,

there may be opportunity and incentive for big
market teams to invest more in players'
salaries in order to maximize profit. On the
other end ofthe spectrum, there may be times
(though seldom) that small market teams
experience having the required minimum
payroll above their marginal revenue curve.
Thus, there is a disincentive to field a
competitive team. An example of this
occurred recently. The Montreal Expos held
a fire sale on their most talented players before
the start ofthe 1995 season, even though they
had one of the lowest payrolls in 1994.
Management for the Expos cited financial
problems as the reason.
A fourth concern is the ability of
management to manipulate the salary cap in
their favor. By staggering the bulk payments
of lucrative contracts in alternating years to
different high-priced stars, teams can
essentially beat the salary cap. Also, teams
t~nd to extend "bonus" incentives to players
that are not reported as raw salary, but
because they can be obtained rather easily,
these bonuses could be counted as guaranteed
salary.
Finally, some would argue that the fact
that teams would be equalized financially does
not necessarily mean they will be equalized
competitively. Indeed, the results from my
third hypothesis test showed no conclusive
evidence that more revenue and higher salaries
translates into more wins. Also, the ~ational
Basketball Association, owners of the most
comprehensive revenue-sharing!salary-cap
plan in professional sports, actually had the
worst competitive imbalance problem of the
four major professional sports of baseball,
football, basketball, and hockey (Quirk and
Fort 1992, p. 293).
In any case, the fact that enormous
revenue differentials exists between big market
teams and small market teams has been proven
The Park Place Economist v.3

and is without debate. Also, there is some
evidence that a revenue-sharinglsalary-cap
plan would equalize teams financially. But the
argument that a cap on salaries would also
solve the competitive imbalance of Major
League Baseb~l is inconclusive.
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